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There is still no categorical answer as to why humans, and no other species, have speech,
or why speech is the way it is. Several purely anatomical arguments have been put
forward, but they have been shown to be false, biologically implausible, or of limited
scope. This perspective paper supports the idea that evolutionary theories of speech
could benefit from a focus on the cognitive mechanisms that make speech possible, for
which antecedents in evolutionary history and brain correlates can be found. This type
of approach is part of a very recent but rapidly growing trend that has already provided
crucial insights on the nature of human speech by focusing on the biological bases of vocal
learning. Here we contend that a general mechanism of attention, which manifests itself
not only in the visual but also in the auditory modality, might be one of the key ingredients
of human speech, in addition to the mechanisms underlying vocal learning, and the pairing
of facial gestures with vocalic units.
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The mechanics of speech have been thoroughly studied. Various
techniques and methodologies have been developed that allow us
to know with great precision what goes on anatomically when
human and non-human primates vocalize, from the lungs to the
lips (Hardcastle et al., 1989; Fitch and Hauser, 1995; Fishman,
2003; Ghazanfar and Rendall, 2008). However, the question of
why (only) humans have speech in the first place remains to be
categorically answered. Different purely anatomical arguments
have been put forward, such as the uniqueness of the descended
human larynx (Fant, 1960; Lieberman and Crelin, 1971) or the
loss of air sacs in humans (de Boer, 2012), but both arguments
have been seriously questioned (Fitch and Reby, 2001; Nishimura
et al., 2006; Littauer, 2012). In fact arguments of this type all share
a general problem: they fail to grasp the mosaic nature of cognitive
faculties that evolution has tinkered with. Modern evolutionary
biology shows that complex traits—and surely speech or indeed
language as a whole falls within that category—require complex
and multi-dimensional explanations (West-Eberhard, 2003; Pigli-
ucci and Müller, 2010).
In addition, there are cases of other, non-human, even non-
vocal-learning species that are capable of producing human-like
vowels (Vs) and consonants (Cs), such as the Gelada Baboons
(Theropithecus gelada), which seem to possess an extremely rich
sound repertoire, comparable to that of humans. More specif-
ically, it has been shown that this species is able to produce
vocalizations that not only employ what we would perceive as Cs
and Vs, but also are structured in a way that resembles human
sound systems, with different vowel qualities and Cs distinguished
by manner and place of articulation, as well as duration similar
to that of human speech (Richman, 1976, et seq; Bergman, 2013).
There are, of course, different ways of articulating sounds with the
same acoustic effect, even among humans, but the very fact that
there are indeed other species that are able to produce Cs and Vs
in a dynamic manner and yet lack human-like speech, shows that
merely having that inventory is not a diagnosis for neither speech
nor language. So why is it, then, that we humans have it and
species like Gelada Baboons don’t? We agree with a growing trend
in the study of human speech (Deacon, 1997; MacNeilage, 2008;
Fitch, 2010) that the answer surely has to do with the presence
of vocal learning mechanisms in humans, for which a biological
basis is emerging (a robust direct laryngeal connection from the
motor cortex seems to be key; Fitch, 2010). But we contend that
answers currently entertained in the literature are insufficient to
account for a foundational property of speech: its Consonant–
Vowel-based organization. Other species, including vocal learning
ones, do not organize their vocal behavior the way we do.
It is generally agreed upon that vowel and consonant sounds
definitely exist. There are mechanical reasons for this (see, e.g.,
Fant, 1960; MacNeilage, 1998, among others). In linguistics,
especially since the work of Chomsky and Halle (1968), it has
been generally assumed that speech sounds are abstractly repre-
sented as bundles of features, which must be somehow encoded
in the brain [see Bouchard et al. (2013) and Mesgarani et al.
(2014) for recent brain work regarding the latter point. Whether
features are innately specified or not is an issue that does not
bear on what follows, and on which we take no stand; see
Clements and Ridouane (2011) for discussion of different per-
spectives]. Whatever basic units of phonological analysis one
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chooses, they generally boil down to articulatory characteristics
(e.g., “bilabial” or “voiced”). However, since just being able to
perceive or produce Vs and Cs is not a diagnostic for speech, as
the vocal behavior of the Geladas illustrates, the productive use
of Cs and Vs in something like speech (and language) might be
explained not only by their encoding in the brain, but also, and
crucially, by their distinct functional/cognitive values.
It has been shown that Vs and Cs are not treated on a par
by human brains. When presented with speech, humans not
only pick out the segments that comprise the sound continuum,
but also ascribe different functional/cognitive weight to different
kinds of segments. Vs and Cs indeed have different roles, with
Cs providing lexical cues and Vs providing cues about syntactic
structures (Nespor et al., 2003). Following Toro et al. (2008),
we will refer to this as the CV hypothesis. A common initial
objection to the CV hypothesis as stated is that the reason why
humans process Cs and Vs in this differentiated manner is their
asymmetric statistical distribution. Languages usually have more
Cs than Vs, and they are distributed in such a way as to facilitate
the extraction of transitional probabilities of Cs and their lexical
information, with the subtler alternations of Vs providing the cues
for structural information. If this were true, humans would be
able to extract lexical and structural information based on the
statistical distribution of segments alone, regardless of their being
Vs or Cs. Building on previous work (e.g., Bonatti et al., 2005),
Toro et al. (2008) tested just that, and found that the bias is deeper
than “mere” statistics: they inverted the roles of Cs and Vs in the
data and presented it to several subjects, who were simply unable
to extract the same rules from the signal. Another objection to
the CV hypotheses would be that the acoustic differences between
Cs and Vs are responsible for their differentiated processing. But
if physical aspects of speech sounds were the sole responsible for
rule extraction one should not expect variation in their functional
roles based on whether the same sounds are interpreted as speech
sounds or as noise. However, research points the other way.
For example, language-related areas are modulated differently
by identical sounds depending on whether they are perceived
as speech or non-speech (Möttönen et al., 2006), and audio-
visual speech perception is triggered by acoustic stimuli perceived
as speech, and not triggered when the exact same stimuli are
perceived as something else (Toumainen et al., 2005).
These results show that the claim that language acquisition
is made possible by general-purpose learning mechanisms (e.g.,
Elman et al., 1996) must be qualified: surely, if this were the
case, humans would have no problem extracting different kinds
of information from any sound system with asymmetrically dis-
tributed segments. It seems instead that there is a more basic
biological bias for extracting lexical information for Cs and struc-
tural information from Vs, by virtue of their functional—and not
statistical—differences.
More generally, it is not the case that the human brain pro-
cesses different information equally. Not unlike speech, vision is
a good example of selective processing of noisy input. In a recent
study (Fiebelkorn et al., 2013), researchers draw a very important
connection between endogenous oscillatory rhythms and space-
based and object-based selection mechanisms. They suggest that
the problem of retrieving the right information despite the abun-
dance of signal is achieved through “rhythmic patterns of visual-
target detection both within (8 Hz) and between (4 Hz) objects”
(p. 2553). Compatible results are reported by Landau and Fries
(2012).
These frequencies fall right within the range reported in
Giraud and Poeppel (2012): the articulatory and the auditory
systems structure their outputs in agreement with one another,
that is, they are mediated by something which allows them to be in
sync. This infrastructure provided by neuronal oscillations might
be the key in explaining how the brain decodes continuous speech.
Crucially, there is a robust relation between the time scales asso-
ciated with speech cues (phonemes, syllables, and intonational
phrases) and the time constants underlying neuronal oscillations
(low-gamma, theta, and delta oscillations). These same oscillatory
cycles have been linked to various “putative precursors” of speech,
such as monkey lip-smacking (Ghazanfar et al., 2012; Fitch, 2013).
We contend that in fact these entrainment patterns, despite being
manifested upon contact with different kind of stimuli, point to
one very general attention mechanism, which has been put to
new use in humans, and which has given speech one of its most
distinctive signatures. Specifically, the fact that two different pat-
terns (∼4 Hz and∼8 Hz) are associated, respectively, with within-
and between-object attention (Fiebelkorn et al., 2013), plausibly
reveals that Cs and Vs are specifically targeted by these differ-
ent frequencies, or at least by a low-frequency/high-frequency
dichotomy within the ranges reported and reviewed by the studies
cited above. This would help explain why Cs are associated with
lexical properties (between-word) and Vs with syntactic/structural
properties (within-word) in the sound continuum. This would
represent a very important ingredient of human speech, absent in
other species, including other vocal-learners. A central question
for our proposal is whether this attention mechanism is confined
to a single domain or, instead, much more general.
Close relationships have been drawn between the underly-
ing mechanisms behind visual and auditory attention, which
all revolve around the recognition, selection and processing of
information in space and/or time. de Freitas et al. (2013) ran
attention experiments on which they tested the so-called same-
object advantage (when the same physical distance is considered,
responses are faster when probes occur within the same object
than when in other objects) in the sound domain. Indeed, they
show that responses are also faster within the same rhythmic
phrase (a tone of a single frequency) than across different rhyth-
mic phrases, with duration being the analog of distance. These
results strongly suggest that human object-based attention is not
exclusive to vision, and most likely not fundamentally spatial, but
rather shared across domains.
There is remarkable coherence between the acoustic and visual
cues of speech, such as temporal correspondence between mouth
opening and acoustic envelope, area of mouth opening and for-
mants, and temporal modulation of mouth movements and voice
envelope (2–7 Hz; Chandrasekaran et al., 2009). A popular topic
that comes up when discussing the relation between visual and
auditory speech cues is the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDon-
ald, 1976), but here we are referring to something different: while
the McGurk effect refers to the interference of (discrepant) visual
cues in acoustic perception (see Tiippana, 2014 for a clarification
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of some misconceptions in this regard), we instead refer to the
shared history and interdependence of auditory and speech cues
at the neural level. Indeed, speech rhythm and facial expressions
in humans are both rhythmic (3–8 Hz) and very much corre-
lated (Golumbic et al., 2013; Ghazanfar and Takahashi, 2014a,b).
Such a correlation has moreover been deemed crucial for the
social interaction required for speech to prosper, that is, the
coordination of individuals of a group through the syncing of
neural processes across brains, in what has been called “brain-
to-brain coupling” (Hasson et al., 2012). As these authors argue,
if cognitive processes underlying complex behavior depended
solely on the processing within the individual’s brain, it would
hard—if not impossible—to reach a set of rules for interactive
behavior to follow and sync. By sending cyclic, brain-generated
signals through the physical environment to another brain, which
decodes and accommodates them, brains really do sync through
oscillatory activity.
On the basis of the findings we have pointed out so far, it is
plausible that this mechanism is indeed general, thus representing
a good example of an already existing capacity put to new use.
Presumably, the recruitment of this domain-general attention
mechanism in the domain of speech was the solution to the
externalization of the complex syntactic/semantic component
that other species lack (Berwick et al., 2011).
A prediction of our hypothesis is that non-human animals—
crucially those which have been shown to distinguish between Vs
and Cs, which might or might not be able to produce them—
will display no functional difference between these two kinds of
segments, and whatever rules they extract from auditory input
will therefore not depend on the cues being Vs or Cs. This is also a
prediction of de la Mora and Toro (2013), who performed experi-
ments on Long–Evans rats (Rattus norvegicus) and concluded that
they actually surpass humans in rule extraction from auditory
input tasks: whereas rats had no problem generalizing rules in
CVCVCV words both over Vs and Cs, humans could only do it for
the Vs, with the same stimuli. Further rule-extracting experiments
with non-human animals will surely strengthen the import of
these results.
Though related, de la Mora and Toro’s (2013) prediction and
ours, however, are not equivalent. For them, whatever makes us
worse than mice at rule extraction from auditory data and thus
better than them at inferring lexical and structural information
must be unique to language, and to humans [by definition, this
would fall under “Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense”
(Hauser et al., 2002)]. They leave the exact nature of this con-
straint up for grabs, but they assume that only “if the observed
differences in how humans process speech are a result of language-
specific constraints, we should not observe functional differences
in other species.” (p. 308) Our prediction makes no claim of
uniqueness to language; we contend that the functional difference
humans attribute to Cs and Vs is due to non-linguistic aspects
of our neurology, namely a general mechanism of attention, and
which along with vocal learning and the ability to produce a
large enough sound inventory formed the basis of human speech.
We agree with Gervain and Mehler (2010, p. 196), that “[i]f
humans and non-human animals share cognitive and/or learning
abilities, these cannot be language specific since only our species
have language. However, they may have been precursors bringing
humans closer to language.”
Our perspective may also benefit from a closer examination
of the relation between the attention mechanism appealed to here
and the general issue of working memory. The literature on work-
ing memory often relates to the one on attention. Furthermore,
it is known that the storage of Vs and Cs differ, both in terms
of stability (storing of Vs being more stable than that of Cs),
and in terms of sensitivity to order information (Vs being more
related to order information in the phonological sequence than
Cs; Drewnowski, 1980; Baddeley, 2007). This seems to converge
with the proposal of Nespor et al. (2003), and with our emphasis
on Cs and Vs having distinct cognitive imports.
A rapprochement between our proposal and working memory
could shed light on the neuroanatomical basis of the C/V dis-
tinction, given recent progress in the characterization of human-
specific connectivity patterns (see Aboitiz, 2012; Scott et al.,
2012; Neubert et al., 2014, among others). We leave a detailed
exploration of this issue for future research.
What is clear to us already is that mechanisms of the sort
we have appealed to here are very much line with what de Waal
and Ferrari (2010) call the bottom-up perspective on human and
animal cognition: looking for wide-ranging, basic mechanisms
across species and domains, instead of asking what is special and
unique about any one trait and species.
As put by Fitch (2013, p. 27), “Although language, as a compos-
ite system, is clearly unique to our species, substantial empirical
work is still required before any of the mechanisms involved in
language can be conclusively labeled unique.” We think this true
also of speech, and believe that the most fruitful way of unveiling
its nature is to study the structure and evolution of each of the
mechanisms involved, such as the one we put forth.
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